Rounds Chairs First SASC Cyber Subcommittee Open Hearing

WASHINGTON – U.S. Sen. Mike Rounds (R-S.D.), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, today chaired the first open hearing of the SASC Subcommittee on Cybersecurity. The hearing focused on cyber-enabled information operations to include the gathering and dissemination of information in the cyber domain.

“Disinformation and ‘fake news’ pose a unique national security challenge for any society that values freedom of speech and a free press," Rounds said in his opening remarks. "Our adversaries aim to leverage our distaste for censorship against us to delegitimize our democracy, influence our public discourse, and ultimately undermine our national security and confidence. It is imperative that we use our experience with the 2016 election to create the defenses necessary to detect and respond to future efforts."

Opening remarks as prepared for delivery:

The Cybersecurity Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on cyber-enabled information operations to include the gathering and dissemination of information in the cyber domain.

We are fortunate to be joined this afternoon by an expert panel of witnesses:

• Chris Inglis, the former Deputy Director of the National Security Agency;
• Michael Lumpkin,  a Principal at Neptune Computer Incorporated and the former Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
• Rand Waltzman, Senior Information Scientist at RAND Corporation; and
• Clint Watts, the Robert A. Fox fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

 

At the conclusion of my remarks and those of Senator Nelson, we will hear briefly from each of our witnesses. 

 

I ask our witnesses to limit their opening statements to five minutes in order to provide maximum time for member questions.

 

The subcommittee has conducted two classified briefings on cyber threats and deterrence of those threats. 

 

The purpose of those briefings was to help our new subcommittee analyze the current situation to include the threat as well as our own strengths and weaknesses. 

 

The briefings included discussion of the report of the Defense Science Board’s Task Force on Cyber Deterrence. 

Today, in our first open forum, we will further discuss threat capabilities, specifically those of Russia, to use new tools to obtain and disseminate information in this new domain of conflict. 

 

Russian information operations, like those we experienced during the 2016 election and currently ongoing in Europe, are not new.

 

Many nation-states, in one form or another, seeks to shape outcomes – whether they be elections or public opinion – to their national security advantage. 

 

In particular, the Soviet Union conducted decades of disinformation operations against the United States and our allies. 

 

However, today’s cyber and other disinformation-related tools have enabled Russia to achieve operational capabilities unimaginable to its Soviet forbear.

 

Our hearing today is not intended to debate the outcome of the 2016 election, which experts agree was not undermined by any cyber-attacks on our voting infrastructure or the counting of ballots.

 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to learn from that experience and other such experiences in order to assess how information operations are enhanced in terms of the reach, speed, agility, precision and impact through cyberspace.

 

Ultimately, we will continue to struggle with cyber-enhanced information operation campaigns until we address the policy and strategy deficiencies that undermine our overall cyber posture.

 

In other words my hope is that this hearing be forward, not backward looking and help lay the foundation for the legislation and oversight necessary to address this national security threat.

 

Disinformation and “fake news” pose a unique national security challenge for any society that values freedom of speech and a free press.

Our adversaries aim to leverage our distaste for censorship against us to delegitimize our democracy, influence our public discourse, and ultimately undermine our national security and confidence.

 

It is imperative that we use our experience with the 2016 election to create the defenses necessary to detect and respond to future efforts.

 

We look to our witnesses to help us better understand the threats we face and develop the tools we need to address it.

 

Just last month we heard from the Defense Science Board about the urgent need for cyber deterrence.

 

According to the Board’s findings “for at least the next decade, the offensive cyber capabilities of our most capable adversaries are likely to far exceed the United States’ ability to defend key critical infrastructures.”

 

Our ability to defend against cyber-enabled information operations will also likely require an element of deterrence and demonstrating that actions will have consequences.

 

With that in mind, we look to our witnesses to help us better understand the challenges cyber enabled information operations will pose for us in the future and what they believe will be required to counter this threat.

 

Information operations are not new and have been used in one form or another in nearly every conflict throughout history.

 

Cyberspace has and will continue to enhance the scope and reach of these campaigns.

 

Our ability to develop a strategy to deter and repel cyber enabled operations is critical. 

 

Our citizens’ confidence in our democratic process depends on it.

 

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